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Abstract 
This paper uses a unique panel data set from Ethiopia to examine the determinants 
of participation in and receipts of food aid through free distribution (FD) and food-for-
work (FFW).  Results show that aggregate rainfall and livestock shocks increase 
household participation in both FD and FFW.  FFW also seems well-targeted to asset-
poor households.  The probability of receiving FD does not appear to be targeted based 
on household wealth, but FD receipts are lower for wealthier households.  The effects of 
FD and FFW on child nutritional status differ depending on the modality of food aid and 
the gender of the child.  Both FFW and FD have a positive direct impact on weight-for-
height.  Households invest proceeds from FD in girls’ nutrition, while earnings from 
FFW are manifested in better nutrition for boys.  The effects of the gender of the aid 
recipient are not conclusive. 
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1.  Introduction 
Food aid programs have become increasingly important for disaster relief in many 
developing countries.  In Ethiopia, a drought-stricken economy with one of the lowest per 
capita incomes in the world, food aid has amounted to almost 10 million metric tons (mt) 
from 1984 to 1998, almost 10 percent of annual cereal production (Jayne et al. 2002).  
Because of the importance of food aid in Ethiopia, much effort has been devoted to 
evaluation of its effectiveness (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999; Barrett and Clay 
2001).  Discussions have often focused on the appropriate modality of food aid, whether 
free distribution (FD) or food-for-work (FFW), the two historically important forms of 
food aid in Ethiopia (Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes 1992).  Ethiopia’s official food aid 
policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid without working on a 
community project in return, supplemented by targeted free food aid for those who 
cannot work.  FD programs distribute cereals (wheat, maize, and sorghum) directly to 
households, while participants in FFW programs typically work in community 
development programs, such as roads, terraces, dams, and local infrastructure 
construction.  The government of Ethiopia now devotes 80 percent of its food assistance 
resources to FFW programs, using the principle of self-targeting (Ethiopia 1996).  While 
much of the literature on FFW has found that self-targeting employment schemes are 
effective in reaching the poor, recent evaluations in Ethiopia have found alternative 
explanations for the targeting of food aid—among which bureaucratic inertia or a history 
of past receipts of food aid is one of the most important determinants (Jayne et al. 2002). 
Many evaluations of food aid have examined its impact on household calorie 
availability.  This paper focuses on the effects of food aid on individual nutritional status, 
as measured by indicators of child nutrition.  The few existing studies of the effects of 
food aid on individual nutritional status do not conclusively indicate whether 
participation in public works improved nutritional status nor measure its long-term 
impact.  For example, Webb and Kumar (1995), using data from a public works program 
in Niger, found that children in high-participation households tended to be more 2 
malnourished than those from low-participation households.  However, this could be due 
to the successful targeting of FFW rather than its impact.  Brown, Yohannes, and Webb 
(1994), using the same data, find that the female shares of public works receipts and days 
worked in FFW have greater positive impacts on child weight-for-age Z scores, 
controlling for the endogeneity of household calorie availability and days worked by 
males and females in FFW.  However, since the data come from a single cross-section, 
analysis of the longer-term impact of FFW was not possible.  Moreover, weight-for-age 
Z-scores capture both long- and short-term effects, making it difficult to infer causality 
from public works participation during the previous year to current nutritional status. 
This paper takes a slightly different perspective from the above studies in 
evaluating the impact of food aid.  First, it draws on a growing body of empirical 
literature that rejects the unitary model of the household in a variety of settings.
1  If, as 
this literature suggests, individuals within households have different preferences and do 
not pool their resources, the effect of public transfers such as food aid may differ, 
depending on who the recipient is.  Indeed, recent human capital investment programs, 
such as the Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (PROGRESA) in 
Mexico, have deliberately targeted cash transfers to women on the grounds that resources 
controlled by women are associated with better educational and nutritional outcomes of 
children (Skoufias 2003).  Moreover, the World Food Programme (WFP)—through 
which one-quarter to one-third of global food aid has been channeled since the late 1980s 
and which is the major food aid donor in Ethiopia—has recently announced that it will 
require women to control the family entitlement in 80 percent of the operations it handles 
directly or subcontracts (Barrett 2002; World Food Programme 1996).  Drawing from 
this literature, the paper examines whether the impact on nutritional status differs, 
depending on the gender of the aid recipient and the gender of the child. 
                                                 
1 For reviews, see Strauss and Thomas (1995), Behrman (1997), and Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 
(1997). 3 
Second, in line with debates on the appropriate modality of food aid, the paper 
investigates the determinants of participation in, and receipts of, food aid through FD or 
FFW, and whether the two modalities of food aid delivery represented by these programs 
matter for the impacts on nutritional status.  The distinction is not between the form of 
the transfer (cash versus food), but the possibility that FD and FFW have different effects 
on the household’s budget constraint, which, in turn, may affect the transfer’s impact.
2  
For example, in Ethiopia, Yamano (2000) finds that FD tends to increase farm labor 
supply of girls, while FFW decreases it.  Lastly, this paper is able to take into account the 
possible endogeneity and codetermination of nutritional status and food aid by making 
use of a unique panel data set from rural Ethiopia that contains information on individual 
anthropometric outcomes and household food aid receipts for four survey rounds between 
1994 and 1997.
3  Since there are multiple observations on individuals, the paper is also 
able to ascertain whether there are longer-term effects of food aid on nutritional status. 
Results show that aggregate rainfall and livestock shocks increase household 
participation in both FD and FFW.  FFW also seems well-targeted to asset-poor 
households, but the probability of receiving FD does not appear to be affected by 
household wealth.  Conditional on being included in FD, however, FD receipts decline 
for wealthier households.  The effects of FD and FFW on child nutritional status differ 
depending on the modality of food aid and the gender of the child.  Both FFW and FD 
have a positive direct impact on weight-for-height, which responds more quickly to short-
run interventions than does height-for-age.  Households seem to invest proceeds from FD 
(which can be interpreted as an increase in unearned income) in girls’ nutrition, while 
earnings from FFW are manifested in better nutrition for boys.  The effects of the gender 
of the aid recipient are inconclusive. 
                                                 
2 There is a separate literature on the desirability of cash versus food in income transfer programs.  See, for 
example, Barrett (2002) and Rogers (1988). 
3 The data set is described more fully in Dercon and Krishnan (2000a, 2000b) and Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing (2002). 4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief 
conceptual model of child nutrition.  Section 3 describes the survey and presents 
descriptive statistics.  Section 4 discusses the empirical specification, while Section 5 
presents the results on the determinants of FD and FFW and their impact on child 
nutritional status.  Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications from the 
research. 
2. Conceptual Model 
A simple model can be used to illustrate the differential effects of FD and FFW 
on child nutrition.  Suppose that the household utility function can be characterized as: 
  U = U(Xp, Xh, L), (1) 
where Xp refers to market-purchased goods, Xh refers to home-produced goods, such as 
child health and nutrition, and L is leisure.  At this point the assumption is that the 
household has a single utility function, although this assumption is later relaxed.  The 
simplifying assumption is made that home-produced goods depend only on household 
labor supply, th.
4  That is, 
  Xh = f(th). (2) 
Suppose the household derives income from agricultural production, wage labor, 
and participation in FFW activities.  Suppose also that the household may be eligible to 
receive food aid through free distribution.  Since free distribution does not require work, 
it is treated as unearned income.
5 
The household income constraint can then be written as 
  pa.Qa(A, ta) + w.tw + wf.tf + N = pXp ,  (3) 
                                                 
4 This is similar to the exposition in Strauss and Thomas (1995). 
5 This abstracts from the time costs of obtaining food aid through free distribution. 5 
where pa.Qa is the value of agricultural output, which is a function of land and other 
agricultural assets A and of time allocated to agricultural production ta.  w.tw is income 
from wage labor, where w is the market wage rate, and tw is time spent in the labor 
market.  wf is the wage rate offered in FFW, which may be lower than the market wage 
rate for self-targeting purposes.  Finally, N is unearned income, which may include 
transfers such as those from FD.  Household income is spent on purchases of the market-
produced good, Xp. 
The time of individuals in the household is allocated to time in own agricultural 
production, time spent in the wage labor market, time on FFW activities, time producing 
home goods, and leisure.  Thus, the household time constraint is as follows: 
  T = ta + tw + tf + th + L. (4) 
Incorporating the household time constraint into the income constraint, the full 
income constraint can be written as 
  pXp + w. L = wT + (pa.Qa – w ta) + (phXh – w th) + N. (5) 
That is, total consumption, including the value of time spent in leisure, cannot exceed full 
income.  Full income is the value of time available to all household members, returns 
from agricultural production, “profits” from home production, and nonlabor income N.  
Maximizing equation (1) subject to the full income constraint yields reduced form 
demand functions for goods x and leisure L, which can be written as a function of prices, 
the vector of wages w (which includes both market wages and wages in FFW), and 
unearned income N, given the household’s asset levels: 
  x = x (p, w, N; A) ,  (6) 
  L = l(p, w, N; A) .  (7) 
Suppose, however, that the household is composed of two individuals, m and f 
(male and female), who do not have the same preferences, nor pool their incomes.  A 6 
collective model of the household would then be more appropriate, and the demand 
functions would be
6  
  xi = xi (p, w, Nm, Nf; Am, Af, αm, αf);  i = 0, m, f. (8) 
  Li = Li (p, w, Nm, Nf; Am, Af, αm, αf);  i = m, f. (9) 
In addition to wages and prices, the demand functions are conditioned on 
individual assets Am and Af and extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEPs) αm and 
αf.  The EEPs affect the relative desirability of being outside the household (e.g., being 
single) and may include access to common property resources and divorce laws.  Gender-
specific targeting practiced in many FFW programs could also be viewed as an EEP that 
increases women’s options outside marriage.  Moreover, if spouses do not pool incomes, 
lump sum transfers such as free food distribution could have different effects, depending 
on whether the husband or the wife were the recipient.  It is possible that FFW wages, if 
lower than the market wage for self-targeting purposes, may not necessarily improve 
women’s outside options.  However, opportunities for women to participate in the labor 
market are rare in rural Ethiopia.  The earmarking of 80 percent of WFP’s FFW 
operations to women, for example, would almost certainly improve their outside options.
7 
Time allocation to various activities, including farm production, home goods 
production, and FFW, could then be expressed as a function of the above right-hand-side 
variables.  This paper investigates the impact of one form of unearned income, FD and 
FFW (which can be interpreted both as a change in the EEP as well as the wage vector) 
on child nutritional status, defined using the indicators weight-for-height and height-for-
age. 
                                                 
6 See Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997) for a review.  For a more detailed exposition and derivation 
of the reduced form demand functions, see Thomas (1990). 
7 In practice, where wages are determined by communities, they have not been set below the market wage.  
Instead, days are rationed to provide employment opportunities for more households (Sharp 1997). 7 
3. Data 
This paper uses all four rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS).  
The 1997 round was undertaken by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa 
University (AAU), in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford 
University.  The first three rounds were conducted in 1994/95 by AAU and CSAE, 
building on an earlier IFPRI survey conducted in 1989.  The ERHS covered 
approximately 1,500 households in 15 villages across Ethiopia.  While sample 
households within villages were randomly selected, the villages themselves were chosen 
to ensure that the major farming systems are represented.
8  Thus, although the 15 villages 
included in the sample are not statistically representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, 
they are quite diverse and include all major agroecological, ethnic, and religious groups.
9 
The questionnaires for the first four rounds consist of a series of core modules on 
various issues such as consumption expenditures, wealth, income, and health, as well as a 
module on anthropometric measurements for all household members.  The questionnaire 
used in the 1997 round includes the original core modules, supplemented with new 
modules specifically designed to address intrahousehold allocation issues.  These 
modules were designed not only to be consistent with information gathered in the core 
modules, but also to complement individual-specific information.
10  Because assets at 
marriage may determine spouses’ bargaining power within marriage (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 2000; Frankenberg and Thomas 2001), a variety of assets brought to the 
                                                 
8 About 400 households in six sites were initially surveyed by IFPRI in 1989; these were selected from 
drought-prone areas for the study by Webb, von Braun, and Yohannes (1992).  Three more sites were 
added in 1994–1995 to include areas north of Debre Berhan, which could not be surveyed in 1989 due to 
military conflict.  Six other sites were also added to cover the main agroclimatic zones and farming systems 
of the richer parts of the country.  The selection of new sites is described in Bereket Kebede (1994). 
9 See Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) for a discussion of the representativeness of the sample. 
10 These are described in more detail in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002). 8 
marriage were recorded, as were all transfers made at the time of marriage.  Values of 
assets at marriage were converted to 1997 birr, using the consumer price index.
11 
The location of the surveyed villages is depicted in Figure 1.  Most surveyed 
villages are placed along a north-south axis.  This ensures a good coverage of the various 
agroclimatic zones that characterize the Ethiopian highlands, where the bulk of the 
population lives.  Arid lowlands and other regions that are particularly hard to reach, such 
as the western part of the country along the Sudanese border, were excluded from the 
sample for cost reasons.  This may limit the policy conclusions on targeting that can be 
drawn. 
Figure 1—Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) sites 
Source:  UNDP-EUE 1998. 
Note:  All borders and survey site locations are approximate. 
                                                 
11 See Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) for details. 9 
Each survey round obtained information on income earned from various activities 
in the past four months, including FFW.  For each activity, information was collected on 
the number of days worked, whether the payment was in cash or in kind, the value of 
cash payments, the quantity and unit of in-kind payments, and the identity of the income 
recipient.  Respondents were also asked whether the household received food aid through 
free distribution, and which person in the household received it.
12  Most participants in 
both FD and FFW received their payments in kind, typically in wheat, maize, sorghum, 
and cooking oil; all in-kind receipts were converted to cash equivalents using the village-
level price. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample households, by survey round.  
About a quarter of the households participated in FFW over the four survey rounds.  The 
proportion that benefited from FD was more variable, ranging from 11 percent in the 
1995 round to 37 percent in the second 1994 round.  There is also greater variation in FD 
compared to FFW receipts.  FD payments were highest in the second round.
13  FD and 
FFW contributed 2 to 7 percent of household monthly consumption across survey rounds. 
Table 1 also presents information on individual rainfall and livestock disease 
shocks.  All data on shocks are self-reported, based on recall of events in the last 
cropping season and the relevant harvest, and are used to construct indices of adverse 
occurrences affecting crop and livestock production.
14  The broad categories of shocks 
are rainfall shocks, nonrain shocks (mostly common problems related to pests, flooding, 
                                                 
12 Ideally we would have interviewed husbands and wives separately, but this was difficult in practice, 
since husbands did not want their wives to speak to male interviewers.  Thus, with the exception of female 
heads of households, the respondent was the husband.  If a woman wanted to conceal her food aid receipts 
from her husband, respondent reports would understate the true value of receipts.  We did administer a 
module on indicators of bargaining power separately to husbands and wives, but only after the interviewers 
had resided in the village for a longer period. 
13 The descriptive statistics pertain to the sample used in the estimation, and will be slightly different from 
those reported by Dercon and Krishnan (2000a).  The estimation sample is slightly smaller than the full 
sample because it includes households present in all rounds and for which there is information on assets at 
marriage. 
14 This description is taken mostly from Dercon and Krishnan (2000b); for comparability, this study used a 
very similar methodology for creating the shock index. 10 
Table 1—Characteristics of sample households, by survey round, Ethiopia Rural 
Household Survey 
Survey round 
1994a 1994b 1995  1997 
Dummy for participant in food-for-work  0.27  0.26  0.26  0.24 
Days worked in past four months (participants only)  36.40  40.90  35.82  36.55 
Value of food-for-work payments received in past four months (participants only), 
in 1997 birr  113.66 121.73 125.82  131.66
Dummy for recipient of free distribution 0.12  0.37  0.11  0.18 
Value of free distribution received in past four months (recipients only), in 1997 
birr 115.45  237.14  65.76  58.97 
Monthly consumption expenditure, net of free distribution and food-for-work, in 
1997 birr  460.68  768.10  545.75  674.87
Monthly equivalent food-for-work receipts, whole sample  29.17  7.13  8.00  8.29 
Monthly equivalent free distribution receipts, whole sample   3.60  19.03  1.38  2.00 
Total monthly consumption, including free distribution and food-for-work, in 1997 
birr 493.45  794.26  555.13  685.16
Contribution of food-for-work and free distribution to monthly consumption, 
percent 0.07  0.03  0.02  0.02 
     
Rainfall index (1 is best)  0.51  0.48  0.62  0.52 
Livestock disease index (1 is best)  0.74  0.89  0.89  0.98 
 
insects, and animal trampling or weed damage), and livestock shocks.  This paper focuses 
only on rainfall shocks and livestock disease shocks, since these tend to be common 
within villages and thus could be a proxy for aggregate shocks.  The individual rainfall 
index was constructed to measure the farm-specific experience related to rainfall in the 
preceding season, based on such questions as whether plowing occurred too early or too 
late for the rain, whether it rained when harvesting, etc.  Responses to each of the 
questions (either yes or no) were coded as favorable or unfavorable rainfall outcomes, 
and averaged over the number of questions asked so that the best outcome would be 
equal to 1 and the worst, zero.  According to Dercon and Krishnan (2000b), the village-
level variance accounted for 77 percent of total variance in the rainfall index.  Similar 
questions were also asked regarding livestock; among the sub-indices referring to 
problems with livestock, this study focused on livestock disease, because contagion 
enables individual shocks to be easily shared within the community.  Relatively speaking, 
livestock disease was quite important in the first round of data collection, particularly in 
the south. 11 
Ethiopia’s history of wars, droughts, and famines has taken its toll on the 
nutritional status of children (Table 2).  Close to half of children between 0 and 9 years of 
age are stunted, an indicator of long-term nutritional deprivation.
15  Wasting, an indicator 
of acute energy deficiency, ranges from 9 to 22 percent for children between 0 and 3 
years of age.  Boys’ and girls’ anthropometric indicators do not significantly differ 
between 0 and 3 years of age, but stunting becomes more prevalent for boys between 
ages 3 and 5 and remains so in the 5–9 age group; wasting is more prevalent among boys 
from ages 5 to 9 (Table 3). 
Table 2—Trends in wasting and stunting, by survey round 
  Survey round 
  1994a 1994b  1995  1997 
Children 0 to 3 years         
    Wasted  0.11 0.09 0.15 0.22 
  Stunted  0.51  0.5  0.52  0.66 
Children 3 to 5 years         
    Wasted  0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 
    Stunted  0.53 0.53 0.52 0.57 
Children 5 to 9 years         
    Wasted  0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 
  Stunted  0.46 0.48 0.43 0.52 
Note:  Wasting is defined as weight-for-height Z-score less than –2; stunting is defined as a height-for-age Z-score of 
less than –2. 
 
Table 3—Weight-for-height and height-for-age Z-scores, by sex 
Weight-for-height Z-scores 
  Age 0–3  Age 3–5  Age 5–9 
 
Number of 








observations  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Males 610  0.14  2.52  571  –0.33 1.56 1,050  –0.42  1.52 
Females 536  0.26  2.68  529  –0.29 1.62 1,172  –0.06  2.07 
t-test of 
difference   –0.76    –0.46     –4.59   
p-value   0.45      0.65     0.00   
  Height-for-age Z-scores 
Males 619  –2.61  2.22  573  –2.49 2.02 1,056  –2.22  1.82 
Females 543  –2.56  2.15  533  –2.27 2.06 1,177  –1.89  1.81 
t-test of 
difference   –0.38      –1.83     –4.35   
p-value   0.70      0.07    0.00   
                                                 
15 Stunting is defined as having a height-for-age Z-score below -2 standard deviations from the NCHS 
standard; wasting is defined as a weight-for-height Z-score below -2. 12 
4. Empirical Specification 
The empirical portion of this paper consists of two parts.  The first part examines 
the determinants of participation in FFW and FFW receipts, as well as the determinants 
of the probability of receiving FD and FD receipts.
16  In addition to individual and family 
characteristics, the study includes household- and village-level rainfall and livestock 
disease shocks to investigate the extent to which households and individuals use food aid 
to mitigate the effects of these shocks.  In the second part, the paper models current child 
nutritional status as a function of past nutritional status, receipts of FFW or FD, 
consumption net of food aid, and aggregate rainfall and livestock disease shocks. 
Determinants of FFW and FD Receipts 
Food aid is targeted using three methods:  administrative targeting, using such 
indicators as asset or livestock ownership, age and gender, nutritional status, access to 
resources such as land and family labor; self-targeting, typically implemented using 
wages below the market wage rate and “inferior” goods; and community-based targeting, 
based on community decisions about the eligibility of households to participate in food 
aid programs (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999).  Thus, food aid receipts are not random 
and will depend on individual, household, and community characteristics.  To take into 
account the endogeneity of participation in FFW and receipt of FD, this paper uses the 
Heckman procedure to correct for selectivity (Heckman 1979).  The study assumes that 
the determinants of food aid receipts operate on two levels.  First, the community decides 
which households are eligible for which type of program, based on program eligibility 
                                                 
16 Since the data are not nationally representative, this study does not examine the determinants of program 
placement, unlike Jayne et al. (2000), who examine wereda- (small regional unit) and household-level 
determinants of participation in food aid programs.  This analysis is at a lower level of disaggregation—the 
household and the individual. 13 
criteria; second, the individual within the eligible household decides to participate in the 
program.
17  That is, the study attempts to estimate 
  Fj = Xjβ + u1j ,  (10) 
where Fj is the receipt of food aid, estimated separately for FFW and FD.  Fj is observed 
only if  
  zjγ + u2j > 0,  (11) 
where u1 ~ N(0, σ), u2 ~ N(0, 1), and corr(u1, u2) =ρ. 
Equation (10) pertains to the determinants of individual receipts, while equation 
(11) is the (unobserved) selection process driven mostly by household characteristics.  In 
the food aid receipts equation, the vector Xj contains individual characteristics such as the 
gender of the FFW participant or FD recipient, age, age squared, height, highest grade 
attained, household size and household composition variables, the value of assets at 
marriage (in 1997 birr) and the share of assets controlled by women, household rainfall 
and livestock disease indices, and village and round dummies.  The household 
composition variables are the proportions in each age-sex demographic category, relative 
to males 15 to 65 years of age (the excluded category).  In the selection equation, the 
vector zj consists of a dummy for a female-headed household, household size and 
household composition variables, both asset-at-marriage variables, community-level 
rainfall and livestock disease indices, and round dummies.  The community-level indices 
for each household were constructed by taking the average over all other households (i.e., 
excluding the particular household).
18  The asset-at-marriage variables are used instead of 
current asset measures, since the latter are arguably endogenous to labor force and asset 
                                                 
17 Selection of households eligible for FD or FFW is done by local-level committee or by the community, 
although actual practice may differ across sites.  Some individuals are predetermined to be eligible for 
FD—e.g., the old, sick, or disabled; lactating and pregnant women; persons who are required to care 
constantly for young children; or incapacitated adults.  For details, see Sharp (1997, 22). 
18 Although it would have been ideal to use actual rainfall data instead of self-reported rainfall data, data 
for all sites for the last survey round were not available. 14 
accumulation decisions; using this set of variables also permits a specification consistent 
with a collective model of household decisionmaking. 
Determinants of Child Nutritional Status 
Child nutritional status is a cumulative measure that depends on inputs in past 
periods and possibly on past nutritional status as well (Strauss and Thomas 1995).  A 
general child health and nutrition production function can be written as 
  Ht = f(Ht-1, Xi, Xh, Xc, u) ,  (12) 
where subscript i denotes a child-level, h, a household-level, and c, a community-level 
covariate, and u represents unobserved heterogeneity.  The input vector may include 
inputs of past periods as well as health, lagged several periods. 
More specifically, child nutritional status can be written as a dynamic panel data 
model, 
  hit = Σ hit-j αj + xitβ1 + witβ2 + νi + εit ,  (13) 
where hit is the nutritional status of child i in period t, hit-j is nutritional status in the t-jth 
period, xit is a vector of exogenous covariates, wit is a vector of predetermined covariates, 
νi are random effects that are independently and identically distributed over the 
individuals with variance σ
2
ν and εit is identically and independently distributed over the 
whole sample with variance σ
2
ε.  The dependent variables are weight-for-height and 
weight-for-age.  The exogenous variables are household- and community-level rainfall 
and livestock disease shocks, while the predetermined variables, lagged one time period, 
are monthly consumption net of food aid, FA receipts (estimated separately for FFW and 
FD and also for the sum of both), the gender of the child interacted with the amount of 15 
the receipt, and the gender of the child interacted with the gender of the aid recipient.
19  
The interaction terms indicate whether food aid has differential effects on children 
depending on their gender, and whether aid recipients have different preferences toward 
children based on gender.  This model is estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). 
5.  Results 
Determinants of Participation in and Receipts from Food-for-Work and Food 
Aid Programs 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the determinants of participation in FFW, days 
worked, and total FFW receipts are presented in Table 4.  FFW participation appears to 
be self-targeted, with wealthier households less likely to participate.  The share of assets 
held by women does not appear to affect the probability of participation, owing to the low 
share of women’s assets for the majority of households (the median value of women’s 
assets at marriage is zero).  Larger households have a higher probability of participating 
in FFW.  Households with a higher proportion of females between 15 and 65 years old 
are more likely to participate in FFW, but households with more females under 15 years 
of age are less likely to participate.
20  Participation in FFW responds as expected to  
                                                 
19 Although mother’s height is an important determinant of child nutritional status, it is not an explanatory 
variable in the regressions.  The Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimator addresses the 
problem of correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term by first differencing to remove 
the individual-specific random effects, and then using lagged levels of the dependent variable and 
predetermined variables and differences of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments.  Individual-
specific variables such as mothers’ height that do not vary through time would drop out.  However, if this 
study were to estimate this equation in levels, mother’s height would be included.  For example, Hoddinott 
and Kinsey (2002) include mother’s height in least-squares regressions of growth in height of children, 
measured in centimeters per year, but mother’s height drops out in the maternal fixed-effects estimates.  
While it is possible that the genetic potential for height can be fully expressed in the height-for-age Z-score 
of a newborn, it is more likely that the Z-score of the child of a tall mother will increase more in childhood 
relative to that of an average or short mother. 
20 This study disaggregated age groups further into children under 6 and children 6–15, but the results do 
not change.  The aggregated results are presented here. 16 
Table 4—Determinants of days worked and payments received, food-for-work program, 
Heckman maximum likelihood estimates 
(Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on households.) 
Days worked 
Probability of 
participation Payment  received 
Probability of 
participation 
  Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score
Female-headed household     –0.01  –0.03     0.01  0.03 
Sex (1 = female)  0.60  0.20    –22.98  –1.19    
Age –0.80  –1.75     3.78  1.02     
Age squared  0.01  1.82     –0.04  –0.88     
Height 0.15  1.11      –1.28  –1.66    
Highest grade  –0.68  –0.89      4.10  0.65     
Log household size  –0.40  –0.13  0.50  4.95 –21.29 –1.12  0.50  4.96 
Males < 15  9.67  1.16 –0.23  –0.73 107.73 1.69  –0.23 –0.73 
Females < 15  23.77  2.95  –0.80  –2.44 148.03  3.27  –0.80  –2.45 
Females 15–65  18.18  2.24  0.89  2.48 9.18 0.19  0.89 2.48 
Males 65+  136.11  3.65  –0.63 –0.94 876.48  2.24  –0.63 –0.94 
Females 65+  –9.07  –0.26  –0.76 –0.92 103.04  0.71  –0.76  –0.92 
Total assets at marriage  0.00  1.35  –0.00  –3.16 0.01 1.27 –0.00  –3.16 
Share of women’s assets  –1.32  –0.22 0.14  0.56 0.79  0.03 0.13  0.52 
Rainfall index  –6.70  –2.47      –2.60 –0.15     
Livestock disease index  –0.38  –0.16      –5.47  –0.29     
Community rainfall index      –1.35  –8.00    –1.35  –7.99 
Community livestock disease 
index     –1.29  –4.35    –1.30  –4.38 
Geblen 6.65  1.47      –57.10  –1.28     
Dinki –16.13  –3.85     –48.45  –1.17     
Shumshaha 36.53  1.28      284.62  1.13     
Adele Keke  4.39  0.64      –9.41  –0.16     
Trirufe Kechema  –13.44  –3.80     –65.25  –1.27     
Imdibir –0.04  –0.01      –12.49  –0.32     
Gara Godo  27.04  6.57     43.10  0.96     
Doma –15.12  –4.63     –43.37  –1.04     
Round 2 dummy  0.17  0.10  0.10  1.85 –6.34 –0.50  0.10  1.85 
Round 3 dummy  –3.60  –2.06  –0.09 –1.52 –5.17  –0.49  –0.09  –1.51 
Round 4 dummy  –4.57  –2.34  –0.11 –1.02 –11.81  –0.82  –0.10  –1.01 
Constant 16.73  0.78  0.58  1.96 239.46  2.02  0.58  1.95 
Log likelihood   –4,007.80      –5,231.75        
Test of independent equations: 
  Chi-square (p-value)  1.24  (0.26)            
  Number of observations  2,753        2,753       
  Censored  2,139        2,139       
  Uncensored  614        614       
Note:  Z-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better. 
 
community rainfall and livestock disease shocks.  Since the rainfall and disease indices 
are constructed so that more favorable outcomes are closer to unity, a higher value of the 
index is a positive shock, and thus the negative signs on the coefficients indicate that 
households are less likely to participate if they receive positive shocks.  Contrary to the 17 
findings of Clay, Molla, and Habtewold, this study does not find that female-headed 
households are more likely to participate in FFW (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999).  
The test of independent equations (fourth line from bottom of Table 4) indicates that the 
receipts and days-worked equations can, in fact, be estimated independently of the 
selection equation. 
Days worked in FFW are negatively related to schooling attainment of the FFW 
participant, but this coefficient is insignificant.
21  Participants in households with a higher 
proportion of working-age females, as well as older males, tend to work more.  The latter 
finding is consistent with that of Clay, Molla, and Habtewold (1999), who find that 
households with older male household heads tend to be disproportionately targeted in 
food aid interventions.  Conditional on participation, household rainfall outcomes also 
affect days worked—individuals in households that experienced negative rainfall shocks 
worked more.  FFW programs do not seem to discriminate against female participants, 
whose earnings are not significantly less than male FFW participants.  Interestingly, FFW 
payments appear to be weakly negatively correlated with height.  This may be due to an 
institutional feature of FFW in Ethiopia.  In many cases, the desire to spread the benefits 
of FFW thinly has led communities to share individual rations among a large number of 
households (Sharp 1997).  If quotas are small, for example, the local committee may cut 
the number of workplaces or rations given to each household rather than reduce the 
number of families assisted, so payments would no longer be directly linked to work 
effort.  In some areas, FFW is also organized on a part-time basis so that participants can 
continue with farming or other work.  Able-bodied participants who are still farming 
could therefore devote less time to FFW and thus would earn less than those without 
outside activities. 
Payments are also higher if the participant belongs to a household with a higher 
proportion of males and females under 15, and with a larger ratio of males over 65 years 
                                                 
21 The coefficient on schooling was negative and significant in the specification that did not include height.  
Schooling and height may thus represent alternative forms of human capital stocks. 18 
of age, conditional on participation.  If these demographic groups are more vulnerable to 
shocks, then payments do seem to provide some protection to them.  While larger 
households have a higher probability of participating in FFW, household size does not 
significantly affect actual receipts, probably due to de jure rules whereby only one 
member of the household is allowed to work (Jayne et al. 2002). 
In contrast to FFW, FD participation, which is determined by the community, 
does not appear to be targeted on the basis of household wealth (Table 5).  Larger 
households surprisingly have a lower probability of receiving FD.
22  However, 
households with a larger proportion of young members, both male and female, also have 
a higher probability of receiving FD.  Lastly, the probability of receiving FD responds to 
aggregate community rainfall and livestock disease shocks:  better rainfall and livestock 
health outcomes reduce the probability of participation.  Turning to FD receipts, the only 
significant determinant of receipts is household assets:  individuals from wealthier 
households receive less FD.  Individual FD receipts do not appear to be affected by 
individual shocks, suggesting that FD is probably targeted at the community level.  
Unlike the results shown in Table 4, the test of independent equations confirms that the 
FD receipt equation (fourth line from bottom of Table 5) cannot be estimated 
independently of the selection equation. 
Impact of Food-for-Work and Food Aid on Child Nutritional Status 
To assess whether food aid has an impact on child nutritional status, this study 
runs regressions on weight-for-age Z-scores and height-for-age Z-scores separately on 
children from 0 to 5 years old and from 5 to 9 years old, for low-asset and high-asset 
households.  Results for low-asset households are presented in Table 6, and for high-asset 
households in Table 7.  Regressors include the lagged change in the anthropometric 
                                                 
22 Jayne et al. (2002) also find a negative relationship between per capita food aid receipts and household 
size.  The negative relationship turns positive when household FFW receipts rather than per capita receipts 
are used as the dependent variable. 19 
Table 5—Determinants of food distribution receipts, Heckman maximum likelihood 
estimates 
(Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on households.) 
FD receipts  Probability of receiving FD
  Coefficient Z-score  Coefficient  Z-score 
Female-headed household      –0.17  –1.21 
Sex (1=female)  –24.73  –0.43     
Age 4.30  0.41     
Age squared  –0.01  –0.07     
Height –2.73  –0.94     
Highest grade  8.42  1.27     
Log household size  1.56  0.02  –0.27  –3.32 
Males < 15  225.18  0.86  0.61  2.52 
Females < 15  –274.98  –1.05  0.55  2.08 
Females 15–65  48.52  0.19  –0.10  –0.38 
Males 65+  78.61  0.14  0.33  0.65 
Females 65+  –215.31 –0.66  –0.16  –0.22 
Total assets at marriage  –0.01  –2.10  0.00 1.31 
Share of women's assets  –11.36  –0.15  0.20  1.17 
Rainfall index  35.85  0.73     
Livestock disease index  69.31  1.36     
Community rainfall index      –2.48  –14.57 
Community livestock disease index      –1.45  –9.54 
Geblen –38.61  –0.14     
Dinki 15.76  0.06     
Shumshaha 298.46  1.04     
Sirbana Godeti  139.00  0.46     
Adele Keke  285.00  1.00     
Korodegaga 190.67  0.68     
Trirufe Kechema  8.49  0.03     
Imdibir 170.76  0.62     
Aze Deboa  431.58  1.45     
Gara Godo  240.03  0.85     
Doma –94.02  –0.34     
Debre Berhan  137.97  0.44     
Round 2 dummy  324.85  2.33  1.10  11.49 
Round 3 dummy  27.16  0.41  –0.17  –1.97 
Round 4 dummy  –75.16  –1.98  –0.00 –0.07 
Constant 181.87  0.49  1.66  9.23 
Log likelihood   –4,523.48       
Test of independent equations: 
  Chi-square (p-value)  10.46  (0.00)    
  Number of observations  2,818       
  Censored  2,360       
  Uncensored  458       
Note:  Z-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better. 
 
measure, first differences in the following variables: the child’s age and age squared, 
household consumption expenditure net of food aid and food for work, community 
livestock and rainfall shocks, and the interactions of the shock variables with child sex, 20 
round dummies, and first differences and lagged differences in food for work, free 
distribution, the value of the aid receipt times a dummy for a female child, and the 
interaction of a dummy variable for a female aid recipient with a dummy variable for a 
female child.  Only the coefficients of the aid variables are presented here.  The 
explanatory variables are expressed either in lags or in first differences, eliminating 
variables that do not vary across time.  Since the sample consists of children for whom 
Table 6—Effects of FD and FFW on child weight-for-height and height-for-age, low-asset 
households 
Weight-for-height Height-for-age 
Children 0–4.9  Children 5–8.9  Children 0–4.9  Children 5–8.9 
 Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score  Coefficient  Z-score
Number of observations  306    415    311    420   
Low-asset households (assets less than or equal to median assets) 
Value of FFW 
  First difference  0.05  1.93  0.01 1.30 –0.04  –1.73  0.00 0.85
  Lagged difference  –0.02  –0.47 0.01  1.04 0.02  0.60  0.00  0.37
Girl x FFW receipt 
  First difference  –0.09  –1.78  –0.01 –0.44  0.02  0.38  –0.00 –0.05
  Lagged difference  –0.02  –0.29 0.00  0.03  –0.05  –0.64  –0.08  –1.99
Girl x female participant 
  First difference  –3.81  –0.29 0.05  0.02  –4.51  –0.33  0.23  0.07
  Lagged difference  –3.13  –0.25 0.02  0.03  –5.85  –0.44  –0.58  –0.47
Value of FD       
  First difference  –0.00  –0.65 0.00  0.10  –0.00  –0.58  0.00  0.18
  Lagged difference  0.00  0.30 0.00  1.42  –0.00  –0.86  0.00  0.09
Girl x FD receipt                 
  First difference  0.00  0.56 0.00  0.29  –0.01  –1.19  –0.00  –0.39
  Lagged difference  0.01  1.19 –0.00  –0.71 –0.01  –1.34  –0.00  –0.00
Girl x female recipient                 
  First difference  1.58  0.43 4.26  1.22  –3.58  –0.92  –0.11  –0.04
  Lagged difference  –1.62  –0.87  –3.98  –2.93  1.45 0.80  –0.06  –0.05
Value of FFW and FD 
  First difference  0.01  1.35 0.00  0.52  –0.01  –1.38  –0.00  –0.38
  Lagged difference  0.00  0.63  0.00  2.61  –0.00 –1.00 –0.00 –0.15
Girl x total value of receipts 
  First difference  –0.06  –0.66 –0.00  –0.31 –0.01  –1.31 0.00 0.50
  Lagged difference  0.01  1.02  –0.00  –0.88  –0.02  –2.94  0.00 0.17
Girl x female FFW participant 
  First difference  2.92  0.37 –9.08  –1.21 –0.73  –0.11 6.91 1.07 
  Lagged difference  2.28  0.29 1.37  0.56  –2.52  –0.40  0.05  0.04 
Girl x female FD recipient 
  First difference  1.16  0.30  4.54  1.65  0.84 0.31  –3.72  –1.41 
  Lagged difference  –0.64  –0.32  –3.68  –2.47  2.62  1.87  –0.09 –0.09 
Notes:  Regressors include lagged change in weight-for-height Z-scores, and first differences in net expenditure, age, 
age squared, community livestock and rainfall shocks, and interactions of the shock variables with child sex, 
and round dummies.  Z-values in bold are significant at 10 percent or better. 21 
Table 7—Effects of free distribution (FD) and food-for-work (FFW) on child weight-for-
height and height-for-age, high-asset households 
Weight-for-height Height-for-age 
Children 0–4.9  Children 5–8.9  Children 0–4.9  Children 5–8.9 
  Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score
High-asset households (assets greater than median assets) 
Number  of  observations  319   431   328   438   
Value of FFW 
  First difference  –0.01  –0.93 –0.01 –0.46  0.00  0.10  –0.01  –0.54 
  Lagged difference  –0.02  –0.76 –0.06 –0.76  0.01  0.29 –0.01 –0.19 
Girl x FFW receipt  
  First difference  –0.01  –0.32 0.01  0.31  0.12  0.95  0.00  0.17 
  Lagged difference  –0.31  –2.25  0.07 0.97 0.19 0.95 0.00  0.11 
Girl x female participant 
  First difference  4.43  0.75 –1.58 –0.47 –6.87 –0.86 –2.46 –1.27 
  Lagged difference  –1.00  –0.43 0.51 0.16 0.58 0.20  –2.02  –0.81 
Value of FD 
  First difference  –0.01  –0.91 –0.00  –0.04  0.00  0.78  0.00  0.06 
  Lagged difference  0.00  2.25  0.00  1.93  0.00 0.82  –0.00  –3.86 
Girl x FD receipt 
  First difference  –0.00  –0.25 –0.00 –0.16  0.01  1.26  0.00  0.15 
  Lagged difference  0.01  2.06  0.00  1.86  0.00 0.79 0.00  0.12 
Girl x female recipient 
  First difference  3.01  1.53  3.63  2.24  0.01 0.00  –1.11  –0.68 
  Lagged difference  –2.16  –1.53  –2.65  –2.17  –0.67 –0.62  0.81  1.26 
Value of FFW and FD 
  First difference  –0.00  –0.47 –0.00 –0.03 –0.00 –0.34 –0.00 –0.44 
  Lagged difference  0.00  2.45  0.00  1.84  0.00 1.04  –0.00  –4.01 
Girl x total value of receipts 
  First difference  –0.00  –0.35 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.36  –0.00  –0.02 
  Lagged difference  0.00  0.65  0.00  1.83  0.00 0.39  –0.00  –0.37 
Girl x female FFW participant 
  First difference  15.34  1.23 –3.57 –1.42  –10.25 –0.83 –1.81 –0.95 
  Lagged difference  3.45  0.99 –0.93 –0.67 –1.56 –0.60 –1.55 –1.24 
Girl x female FD recipient 
  First difference  4.51  1.59  2.77  1.73  –0.07 –0.04 –0.01  –0.01 
  Lagged difference  –1.40  –0.50  –2.60  –2.16  0.26 0.26 1.43  1.60 
Notes:  Regressors include lagged change in weight-for-height Z-scores, and first differences in net expenditure, age, 
age squared, community livestock and rainfall shocks, and interactions of the shock variables with child sex, 
and round dummies.  Z-values in bold are significant at 10 percent or better. 
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we have observations on all four rounds within each age group, and because the 
differencing procedure reduces the number of observations used in estimation, the sample 
size used for estimation is much smaller than the original sample size of children.
23 
Regression results for low-asset households (Table 6) show that both FFW and 
FD have gender-differentiated impacts.  FFW has a positive direct impact on weight-for-
height for children ages 0 to 5 in low-asset households, although there is weak evidence 
that FFW has improves boys’ weight-for-height more than it does girls’.  This effect does 
not depend on the gender of the aid recipient.  In contrast, among older children, if FD is 
received by a woman, it results in an improvement of boys’ weight-for-height relative to 
that of girls.  The lagged difference of total aid receipts has a positive impact on weight-
for-height of older children.  The effects of the interaction of child sex and a female 
recipient in the combined aid regression do not show a consistent pattern of gender 
preference. 
Since height-for-age is a measure of long-term nutritional status, it is not as 
responsive to food aid interventions in the short run as is weight-for-height.  This study 
finds that FFW has a weak negative impact on height-for-age of younger children.  
Similar to the effects on weight-for-height, total food aid receipts seem to improve boys’ 
height-for-age more it does girls’.  If a woman is the FD recipient, however, this weakly 
favors younger girls.  Height-for-age of older children is less responsive to food aid 
partly because height growth slows down for older children.  The only significant food 
aid variable (the lagged difference in FFW receipts interacted with the female child 
dummy) suggests that FFW receipts tend to improve boys’ long-run nutritional status 
relative to girls. 
Do these effects differ for high-asset households?  Among younger children, FFW 
receipts improve boys’ weight-for-height relative to girls.  In contrast, FD has both a 
                                                 
23 Attrition bias may arise because children who remain in the sample for all four rounds may be better 
nourished than those who leave the sample (as in child death due to undernutrition).  However, in this 
analysis, the reduction in sample size arose mainly because of the differencing procedure and the age 
criterion used to define the sample for estimation. 23 
positive direct effect on weight-for-height for both older and younger children, and tends 
to benefit girls.  Total food aid receipts, regardless of modality, improve weight-for-
height, and weakly favor girls.  The effects of the gender of the FD recipient on girls are 
not consistent, with the first difference showing a positive effect, and the lagged 
difference a negative one.  Consistent with the relative insensitivity of height-for-age to 
short-run interventions, the aid variables have a negligible impact on height-for-age.  
Although not reported in the tables, the strongest determinant of height-for-age is the 
lagged change in height-for-age.  There is an indication, however, that FD receipts have a 
lagged negative effect on height-for-age of older children, although the coefficients are 
very small in magnitude. 
To summarize, FFW has a positive direct impact on the weight-for-height of 
younger children in low asset households, while FD has a similar positive impact on 
children of both age groups in high-asset households.  The effect of FFW on low-asset 
households probably reflects its self-targeting features.  Does food aid have a differential 
effect on child gender, depending on its modality?  In both low- and high-asset 
households, FFW receipts appear to be invested in improving boys’ nutritional status 
relative to girls, while in high-asset households, girls’ nutritional status improves with 
FD.  The effects of a female recipient of food aid are inconsistent.  To interpret these 
results, we return to the collective model of the household.  FD receipts, which are not 
conditional on work effort, can be considered a form of unearned income.  FFW 
opportunities, on the other hand, reflect a change in the wage rate as well as 
improvements in women’s outside options.  Increases in the households’ unearned 
income from FD are invested in girls, but changes in the wage rate and in women’s 
outside options from FFW translate into better outcomes for boys. 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper has examined the effects of food aid on child nutritional status through 
two complementary analyses:  one of the determinants of participation in, and receipts 24 
from, two types of food aid programs, and investigation of the effects of food aid on child 
nutritional status.  The analysis of both FD and FFW receipts shows that these increase 
with negative rainfall and livestock shocks, thus performing an important consumption-
smoothing function.  Participation in FFW also seems to be well-targeted to poorer 
households.  While participation in FD seems to be motivated more by household 
characteristics such as the presence of young children rather than household wealth, FD 
receipts do decline with wealth.  Thus, both programs are also reaching poorer and more 
vulnerable households in their communities.  The analysis at the first level, however, 
does not reveal who in the household benefits from aid received.  The analysis of child 
nutritional status shows that the effects of food aid on individuals within the household 
differ, depending on the modality of food aid and the gender of the child.  Both FFW and 
FD have a positive direct impact on weight-for-height, which is expected to respond more 
to these interventions in the short run.  Households seem to invest proceeds from FD, 
which can be interpreted as an increase in unearned income, in girls’ nutrition, while 
earnings from FFW are manifested in better nutrition in boys.  The effects of the gender 
of the aid recipient are not conclusive. 
Why would different forms of transfer income be invested differentially 
depending on the gender of the child?  First, parents may want to use some forms of aid 
to redress imbalances among children.  Nutritional status indicators, while poor for both 
boys and girls, become progressively worse for boys (see Table 3).  Second, it may be 
due to returns that parents expect to reap from children in their old age.  In related work 
using the same data set, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) find that daughters of mothers 
who bring more resources to the union have inferior educational outcomes than do their 
brothers.  If boys are important sources of old-age security, mothers may choose to invest 
preferentially in boys.  If FFW is increasingly targeted to women, mothers may use their 
increased bargaining power to preferentially invest in boys.  A general increase in 
household wealth, however, operating through FD receipts, may result in better outcomes 
for girls. 25 
These findings suggest that stopping at the household level to assess the impact of 
food aid may not reveal how the modality of food aid affects investments in the next 
generation.  The effects of food aid are not limited to its effects on unearned income and 
women’s outside options.  Children’s time allocation may also change, depending on the 
modality of food aid (Yamano 2000).  Participation in FFW may also affect time 
allocation and nutritional status of participants.  While participation in demanding 
physical labor such as FFW may improve children’s nutritional outcomes, it may lead to 
a deterioration in the participants’ own nutritional status as well as a reallocation of time 
away from the production of home goods, again with implications for child health and 
nutrition.
24 
Program designers need to examine the impact of food aid on individual 




                                                 
24 Evidence that increased physical labor is detrimental to nutritional status can be found in Higgins and 
Alderman (1997). 26 
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